||Secure Program Execution Via Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
||Suh, G. Edward
||Jaewook Lee, David Zhang, Srinivas Devadas
|LCS Document Number:
|We present a simple architectural mechanism called dynamic
information flow tracking that can significantly improve the
security of computing systems with negligible performance
overhead. Dynamic information flow tracking protects programs against malicious software attacks by identifying spurious information flows from untrusted I/O and restricting
the usage of the spurious information.
Every security attack to take control of a program needs
to transfer the programís control to malevolent code. In
our approach, the operating system identifies a set of input
channels as spurious, and the processor tracks all information flows from those inputs. A broad range of attacks are
effectively defeated by checking the use of the spurious values as instructions and pointers.
Our protection is transparent to users or application programmers; the executables can be used without any modification. Also, our scheme only incurs, on average, a memory
overhead of 1.4% and a performance overhead of 1.1%.
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