LCS Publication Details
Publication Title: Marriage, Honesty, and Stability
Publication Author: Immorlica, Nicole
Additional Authors: Mohammad Mahdian
LCS Document Number: MIT-LCS-TR-913
Publication Date: 7-28-2003
LCS Group: Theory of Computation
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Many centralized two-sided markets form a matching between participants by running a stable marriage algorithm. It is a well-known fact that no matching mechanism based on a stable marriage algorithm can guarantee truthfulness as a dominant strategy for participants. However, as we will show in this paper, in a probabilistic setting where the preference lists of one side of the market are composed of only a constant (independent of the the size of the market) number of entries, each drawn from an arbitrary distribution, the number of participants that have more than one stable partner is vanishingly small. This proves (and generalizes) a conjecture of Roth and Peranson [23]. As a corollary of this result, we show that, with high probability, the truthful strategy is the best response for a given player when the other players are truthful. We also analyze equilibria of the deferred acceptance stable marriage game. We show that the game with complete information has an equilibrium in which a (1?o(1)) fraction of the strategies are truthful in expectation. In the more realistic setting of a game of incomplete information, we will show that the set of truthful strategies form a (1+o(1))-approximate Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Our results have implications in many practical settings and were inspired by the work of Roth and Peranson [23] on the National Residency Matching Program.
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